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I. INTRODUCTION
Homebuyer (H) buys a house for $100,000. He pays $10,000 in cash and
obtains the other $90,000 by taking out a mortgage on the property with
Lender (L). H makes payments for ten years before losing his job and
defaulting on the mortgage. During those ten years, the value of the
property increases to $200,000 and H pays the principal balance of the
mortgage down to $60,000. Lforecloses on the property. At auction, L is
the only bidder and wins with a bid of $60,000. Although H had
$140,000 of equity, he recovers nothing.
In 2008, lenders foreclosed on more than 2.3 million properties within the United
States.' As the above hypothetical suggests, many homeowners lose both the
foreclosed property and the equity2 they had acquired-a financial disaster.
3
Lenders are also harmed by inefficient foreclosure proceedings. In situations
where the homeowner does not hold any equity in his property, lenders are often still
forced to hold unnecessary and economically inefficient foreclosure auctions.4 The
increased costs from these proceedings are then passed on to future borrowers in the
form of higher interest rates. As a result, all parties suffer from foreclosure's flaws.
This Comment argues that the existing foreclosure system unduly harms both
buyers and lenders. To solve these problems, this Comment suggests a bifurcated
foreclosure process which would benefit mortgagees, mortgagors, the borrowing
public, and third-party creditors.
Part II of this Comment provides an overview of mortgage obligations and
describes the foreclosure process. This section emphasizes the need for reform,
illustrating the importance of the mortgage as security for debt and the extent of the
current foreclosure crisis. This section then explains the various foreclosure
1. RealtyTrac, Foreclosure Activity Increases 81 Percent in 2008, Jan. 15, 2009, http://www.realtytrac.
com/ContentManagement/pressrelease.aspx?ChannellD=9&ItemD=5681&accnt=64847 (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
2. See Debra Pogrund Stark, Facing the Facts: An Empirical Study of the Fairness and Efficiency of
Foreclosures and a Proposal for Reform, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 639, 640 n.l (1997) (defining "equity" in
property as "the extent to which the fair market value of the property exceeds the amount of debt secured by the
property").
3. Basil H. Mattingly, The Shiftfrom Power to Process: A Functional Approach to Foreclosure Law, 80
MARQ. L. REV. 77, 77 n.l (1996).
4. See infra Part II.B (explaining that lenders are often forced to sell foreclosure properties twice: once
at auction and again through traditional means).
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proceedings used throughout the fifty states, concluding with a brief discussion of
anti-deficiency legislation and other statutory safeguards.
Part III critiques current foreclosure law, arguing that existing law fails to
protect a borrower's equity in his or her property while providing lenders with an
economically inefficient method of debt collection. In particular, this section
identifies and explains factors inherent in current foreclosure law that serve to
eliminate competitive bidding and produce artificially low sale prices at
foreclosure auctions. This section then discusses the costs of the foreclosure
process and concludes that foreclosure auctions are unnecessary and
economically inefficient in cases where mortgage debt exceeds homeowner
equity.
Part IV proposes a foreclosure reform which would protect homeowner
equity while reducing overall process costs. Specifically, Part III proposes a
bifurcated foreclosure process in which the court would mandate either a judicial
strict foreclosure proceeding or a standard foreclosure auction with the
imposition of a fair value limitation, depending upon the homeowner's equity in
the foreclosure property. This proposal draws substantial support from fraudulent
transfer law.
II. MODERN FORECLOSURE LAW
A. The Mortgage
1. Overview
Without question, homeownership represents a key component of the
"American Dream."5 For many Americans, the prospect of homeownership
represents fiscal responsibility, financial success, and security.6 Indeed,
homeownership "has been a principal source of wealth creation for low- and
moderate-income people."7
Hoping to realize the substantial financial benefits that can come with
homeownership, many Americans have invested substantial portions of their net
wealth in residential property.8 In 2004, homeownership peaked at 69.3% of
households.9 While this statistic may seem impressive, it rests on shaky and
unsustainable foundations.0° Between 1983 and 2004, the percentage of
5. See generally ERIC S. BELSKY ET AL., CHASING THE AMERICAN DREAM: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON
AFFORDABLE HOMEOWNERSHIP (William M. Rohe & Harry L. Watson eds., 2007).
6. Id.
7. Bloomberg News, Homeownership Declines for Fourth Consecutive Quarter, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27,
2007, at C2.
8. See Vikas Bajaj & Edmund L. Andrews, Broader Losses from Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2007,
at Al (noting that more Americans own homes than own stock).
9. Bloomberg News, supra note 7.
10. See id. ("[A]s much as 70 percent of the increase in the aggregate homeownership rate over the
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homeowners between the ages of 55 and 65 who owned their homes free of debt
dropped from 52% to 36%." Although homeownership as a whole may have
risen, "[n]ever before have homeowners actually had such a small ownership
stake in the houses they occupy.""
Because the vast majority of Americans cannot afford to buy property in
cash, many obtain financing by taking out a mortgage (or deed of trust) 3 on the
purchased property. A mortgage allows the buyer (the mortgagor) to put a
relatively small amount of money down and to finance the rest through a loan
secured by the mortgaged property. 5 To ensure repayment of the loan, the lender
(the mortgagee) acquires an interest in the collateral property. 6
Prior to the 1980s, residential mortgages were relatively simple.' 7 Most loan
companies offered "fully amortized fixed interest rate" mortgages that
guaranteed mortgagors a fixed payment amount for the life of the loan."
Homebuyers knew what to expect from their mortgages and could plan their
finances accordingly.
However, the typical mortgage began to change in the 1980s. 9 With the
introduction and rapid proliferation of mortgage loans containing adjustable
rates, postponing principal payments, and providing for negative amortization,
many homebuyers entered into loans that they did not understand and could not
afford.20 At least in part due to these questionable lending practices, many
Americans are no longer able to meet their mortgage payments.2'
decade was a result of the introduction of new mortgage products.").
11. Louis Uchitelle, A False Sense of Security? You Must Own a Home, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/0l/business/yourmoney/0lview.html (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
12. Id.
13. A deed of trust is treated as a mortgage for all intents and purposes. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL.,
PROPERTY 545 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 6th ed. 2006).
14. Id. at 541-42.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 542. Depending upon state law, the interest may be classified either as a lien on the secured
property, a transfer of title to the secured property, or a combination of the above two approaches in which "the
mortgagee is entitled to possession of the property only upon the mortgagor's default but before foreclosure is
completed." The different theories are referred to respectively as the lien theory, title theory, and intermediate
theory. JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW 343 (1 st ed. 2000).
17. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 13, at 542 (contrasting the relatively simple pre-1958 mortgage
financing process with the current process which, spurred by the recently developed secondary loan market,
created numerous types of complex loans).
18. Id.
19. Michael H. Schill, Uniformity or Diversity: Residential Real Estate Finance Law in the 1990s and
the Implications of Changing Financial Markets, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1265-71 (1991) (suggesting that this
change was the product of "deregulation, the growth of the secondary mortgage market, securitization, and
technological advances").
20. Gretchen Morgenson, Can These Mortgages Be Saved?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2007, http://www.
nytimes.comI2007/09/30business/3Ocountry.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (citing numerous
examples of homeowners who entered into different types of complex and confusing loans that ultimately
played a role in the homeowners defaulting on their mortgages).
21. Id.
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By the time a mortgagor becomes delinquent on her payments, she is already
in dire straits. Although she must act quickly to avoid foreclosure, research
indicates that "half of all homeowners facing foreclosure are afraid to contact
their lender for help."" Compounding this problem, even those who do attempt to
avoid foreclosure often procure unsatisfactory and inequitable results. According
to borrowers' advocates, homeowners who seek help from their lender
"encounter hostility and are charged large and unexplained fees throughout the
foreclosure process-whether or not they wind up keeping their homes."23 Put
simply, it is extremely difficult for a homeowner to avoid foreclosure once she
becomes delinquent on her mortgage payments.
2. Crisis
The bubble of unsustainable mortgage loans has burst. "For the first time
since the Carter administration, homeownership in the United States is set to
decline over a president's tenure." According to RealtyTrac, an online provider
of foreclosure data, foreclosure filings rose by 242% between the third quarter of
2008 and the same period two years earlier.25 In the third quarter of 2008, new
foreclosure filings reached 765,000.26 Some areas have seen extraordinary
increases; foreclosure filing rates in New Hampshire increased by 2,785% in one
27year. As one commentator predicted, the national foreclosure wave has now
become a tsunami.28
The foreclosure crisis has had a profound impact on the national economy. In
December 2008, the United States officially entered a recession.2 ' Further, the
foreclosure crisis is far from over. ° "As home prices continue to decline
22. Jay Romano, When Borrowers Face Foreclosure, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2007, http://www.nytimes.
com/2007/10/14/realestate/14Home.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
23. See Morgenson, supra note 20 (giving the example of homeowners who attempted to reach
Countrywide, "the nation's largest mortgage originator and loan servicer").
24. Editorial, The American Dream in Reverse, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2007, at A18.
25. David Stout & Brian Knowlton, Senators Press for Action to Stem Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23,
2008, http://www.nytimes.comV2008/10/24/business/economy/24cong.htm?-f-r=&sq=2nd%20quarter%2Oforeclos
ure%20realtytrac&st=cse&adxnnl=l&scp=I&adxnnlx=1230665499-6w2lMHN4GwPIK0Y4aDAnUQ (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review); RealtyTrac, Foreclosure Activity up 30 percent in Third Quarter, http://www.
realtytrac.com/ContentManagement/pressrelease.aspx?Channe]ID=9&ltemiD=-3567&accnt=64847 (last visited
Mar. 21, 2009) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
26. Stout & Knowlton, supra note 25.
27. RealtyTrac, supra note 25.
28. Morgenson, supra note 20.
29. Edmund L. Andrews, Officials Vow to Act Amid Signs of Long Recession, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/021business/economy/O2econ.html?ref=business (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
30. RealtyTrac, Is Negative Equity Important?, Dec. 17, 2008, http://www.foreclosurepulse.com
/blogs/mainblog/archive/2008/12/17/is-negative-equity-important.aspx (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
("Several economists believe home prices need to fall further in order to make housing more affordable.
MarketWatch chief economist Irwin Kellner says housing needs to fall another 20 percent, while Princeton
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nationwide, many homeowners find themselves with negative equity, owing
more on their loans than their houses are worth."'" In September 2008, "7.5
million mortgages, or 18 percent of all homes with mortgages, were
underwater. 32 Some commentators predict that this number may rise as high as
15.3 million before the foreclosure wave passes.33 Inevitably, many of these
homes will go through the foreclosure process. To best deal with the current and
oncoming housing crisis, it is prudent to reevaluate the fairness and efficiency of
the foreclosure process.
B. The Foreclosure Process
1. Initial Steps
When a mortgagor defaults on a mortgage payment, the mortgagee may force
a sale of the collateral property to ensure repayment of the mortgage debt.3 4 To
begin the foreclosure process, the mortgagee first notifies the mortgagor in
writing that the mortgagor is in default and that the mortgagee intends to initiate
foreclosure proceedings.33 In every jurisdiction, the mortgagor36 then has a right
to restore title to the mortgaged property by paying the full remaining amount of
the mortgage.37 This right, commonly referred to as the "equity of redemption,"
materializes after a default has occurred and terminates at the conclusion of the
foreclosure sale. 3' Although some states allow the mortgagor to redeem the
property after the conclusion of the foreclosure sale, this remedy must be
statutorily granted.39
If the mortgagor does not redeem the property, the mortgagee may force a
sale of the collateral property. Three methods of foreclosure are used in the
economist and New York Times columnist Paul Krugman suggests a 30 percent decline is needed.").
31. Id. ("Negative equity, or being 'underwater,' exposes borrowers to foreclosure because they usually
can't refinance or sell their homes in a declining real estate market.").
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 569-70 (5th ed. 2007); see
also Holt v. Citizens Cent. Bank, 688 S.W.2d 414, 414-15 (Tenn. 1984) (giving an example of a mortgagor who
defaulted on his mortgage payment, resulting in the bank foreclosing and selling the property); SPRANKLING,
supra note 16, at 349 (outlining the foreclosure process).
35. SPRANKLING, supra note 16, at 349.
36. In addition to the mortgagor, "[a]ny person who may have acquired any interest in the premises,
legal or equitable, by operation of law or otherwise, in privity of title with the mortgagor, may redeem, and
protect such interest in the land." Smith v. Austin, 9 Mich. 465, 474 (1862); see also Dawson v. Overmyer, 40
N.E. 1065 (Ind. 1895) (holding that an administer of an estate which had an interest in real property had the
same rights in the land as the original estate holder).
37. Although a mortgagor must pay the full amount remaining on the mortgage to exercise the equitable
right of redemption, the mortgagee may consent to partial redemption in lieu of full payment. NELSON &
WHITMAN, supra note 34, at 569-75.
38. Id. at 569-70; SPRANKLING, supra note 16, at 349.
39. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 34, at 745.
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United States: strict foreclosure, judicial foreclosure, and foreclosure by power of
sale. 0 The two predominant methods are judicial foreclosure and foreclosure by
power of sale; strict foreclosure is allowed in only two states.4
2. Foreclosure
a. Judicial Foreclosure
Judicial foreclosure is a statutorily created remedy that allows the mortgagee
to force a sale of security property when the debt secured by the property has
fallen into default.4 2 Judicial foreclosure is permitted in all jurisdictions and is
justified when a mortgage is in default. 3 In a judicial foreclosure, the mortgagee
must first conduct a title search to determine all persons holding an interest in the
property, and must subsequently notify such persons." Following notice and
service of process, the mortgagor and other interested parties may contest the
foreclosure in a hearing. 5
If the court deems the foreclosure justified, it orders a public sale of the
property, subject to the mortgagor's equitable right of redemption. 46 The
mortgagee must then notify the public of the pending sale.4 ' The most common
method of notification is newspaper advertisements. s If the mortgagor does not
exercise his equitable right of redemption, the sale takes place in a public
location and is open to the mortgagor, mortgagee, and the public. 49 "The
mortgagee, however, enjoys an important advantage in the process: it can bid
without cash [something no other bidder can do], using instead the unpaid loan
balance owed to it." 50
The mortgagee must then seek judicial confirmation of the sale and must
deliver the deed to the highest bidder.5' Although the court has the power to
40. See id. at 596 (describing strict foreclosure); SPRANKLING, supra note 16, at 349 (describing judicial
foreclosure and foreclosure by power of sale).
41. Both Connecticut and Vermont allow strict foreclosure. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-15
(1975); 12 VT. STAT. ANN. § 4528 (1982); Dieffenbach v. Att'y Gen., 604 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1979); Brooklyn
Sav. Bank v. Frimberger, 617 A.2d 462 (Conn. 1992); NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 34, at 596-97;
SPRANKLING, supra note 16, at 349.
42. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 34, at 601;SPRANKLING, supra note 16, at 349, 350-51.
43. Id.
44. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 34, at 601-02 (pointing out the disadvantages of judicial
foreclosure, including the need to conduct "a preliminary title search to determine all parties in interest" and file
a "foreclosure bill of complaint and lis pendens notice").
45. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 34, at 601-02; SPRANKLING, supra note 16, at 350.
46. SPRANKLING, supra note 16, at 350.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 350-51.
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refuse to confirm a sale, "in most states the mere inadequacy of the sales price is
not a basis for refusing confirmation."52 Accordingly, it is difficult for a
mortgagor to upset a completed sale and courts rarely do so. 3 While this practice
promotes stability of title in completed foreclosure sales, it also creates the
potential for inequitable results. 4 "In the vast majority of cases, the sale price
realized.., will be so inadequate that not only will the mortgagor lose her home
but she will also lose any equity she owns in the property."55
b. Power of Sale Foreclosure
Power of sale foreclosure is a contractual remedy and must be "authorized by
the express terms of the mortgage. 56 Unlike judicial foreclosure, in a power of
sale foreclosure the mortgagee does not need to file a lawsuit or involve the court
to force sale of the security property. 7 Power of sale is by far the most dominant
method of foreclosure within states that permit such contracts.58 Over thirty states
currently allow parties to provide for a power of sale foreclosure through
contract. 9 Power of sale foreclosure is an economic alternative to judicial
foreclosure because it eliminates the substantial burdens of judicial oversight
while facilitating the satisfaction of debt and effective transfer of property.60
Although the lack of judicial oversight creates the potential for abuse, states
"usually provide statutory safeguards for the mortgagor., 6' The Uniform Land
Transactions Act (ULTA) 61 provides an example of common statutory
safeguards, including advance notice to interested parties, a grace period in
which the mortgagor may exercise his right of redemption, and special protection
63for owner-occupied residences.
52. Id. at 350.
53. Id.
54. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 34, at 631-33 (noting that judicial foreclosures produce a more
stable title than power of sale foreclosures).
55. Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Critiquing the Foreclosure Process: An Economic Approach Based on the
Paradigmatic Norms of Bankruptcy, 79 VA. L. REV. 959, 959 (1993) (noting that a large number of foreclosed
properties sell for significantly less than their fair market value at foreclosure sales).
56. SPRANKLING, supra note 16, at 351.
57. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 34, at 633-36 (outlining power of sale foreclosure and
comparing it to judicial foreclosures); SPRANKLING, supra note 16, at 351 (explaining that power of sale
foreclosure is "without judicial involvement or approval").
58. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 34, at 633-36.
59. Id. at 633 n.l.
60. Id. at 636.
61. SPRANKLING, supra note 16, at 351.
62. "No state thus far has adopted the ULTA in whole or in part." NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 34,
at 634 n.8.
63. Id. at 634-35.
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Following notification of interested parties, the mortgagee sells the property
at a public sale similar to a judicial foreclosure. 64 Unlike judicial foreclosure,
however, the mortgagee need not seek judicial confirmation of the sale. 65 To
upset a completed power of sale foreclosure, the mortgagor (or other interested
party) must show fraud, unfairness, or other irregularity in the sale. 6 As in
judicial foreclosure proceedings, inadequacy of sale price alone is not enough to
upset a sale 67 and it is extremely rare for a court to upset a sale based on fraud,
68
unfairness, or irregularity.
c. Strict Foreclosure
Although strict foreclosure was once the predominate method of
foreclosure, 69 it is now authorized in only two states: Connecticut and Vermont.' °
Strict foreclosure is the most economically efficient method of foreclosure, as it
does not involve a forced sale of the property.
71
Following default on a loan, the mortgagor receives notice of the pending
foreclosure and is granted the equitable right to redemption . If the mortgagor
cannot repay the outstanding debt, the mortgagee simply takes title to the
property to satisfy the debt. 73 Although a mortgagor or other defendant (such as a
junior leinholder) may argue that the property is worth more than the unpaid loan
amount and should be sold in a forced sale, the court requires a strong showing of
inequity and has wide discretion in deciding the issue.74 While economically
efficient, the strict foreclosure method can easily be abused and can work great
inequity to the mortgagor and other interested parties.75
64. SPRANKLING, supra note 16, at 351.
65. Id.
66. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 34, at 640-41.
67. Id. at 640. Mortgagors may also attempt to overturn a sale by proving defects in the time, place, or
manner of the sale. Id. at 640-50.
68. Id. at 640.
69. See Mattingly, supra note 3, at 89-94 (explaining how the United States inherited England's strict
foreclosure process).
70. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 34, at 597.
71. See id. ("[T]he defaulting mortgagor is given a period of time by the court to pay the mortgage debt.
Failure to do so within the prescribed time will result in title to the mortgaged real estate vesting in the
mortgagee without sale.").
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 597-600.
75. See Mattingly, supra note 3, at 89-94 (explaining that after inheriting strict foreclosures from
England, American courts "viewed strict foreclosure as unduly harsh because it did not protect a borrower's
equity in the property").
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d. Deed of Trust Sales
Before the proliferation of power of sale mortgages, lenders issued deeds of
trust as a way to circumvent the statutory requirements of the judicial foreclosure
process. To create a deed of trust,
[t]he borrower (the trustor) execute[s] a written instrument conveying
legal title to a neutral third party (the trustee), as security for an
obligation owed to the lender (the beneficiary). If the trustor duly repaid
the loan, the trustee would reconvey title. On the other hand, if the trustor
defaulted on the debt, the trustee would conduct an auction sale of the
property; after the sale, the trustee would repay the beneficiary and
affected creditors and distribute any remaining sales proceeds to the
trustor.76
Despite their name, deeds of trust do not create true trust relationships.77
Instead, a deed of trust creates a relationship analogous to a mortgage
relationship." Accordingly, mortgagees cannot expect to be protected by the
trustee in charge of the public auction; no true fiduciary relationship exists. 9
Although some courts require that sales conducted pursuant to a deed of trust be
"commercially reasonable," most jurisdictions view the lender's remedy as the
functional equivalent of a power of sale.s°
3. After the Sale
a. Deficiency Judgments
What happens if a foreclosed property sells for less than the amount
necessary to pay the remaining mortgage debt? In many states, the mortgagee
may file a deficiency judgment suit against the mortgagor to recover the
difference between the sale price and the outstanding mortgage debt.' The
76. SPRANKLING, supra note 16, at 357.
77. Monterey S.P. P'ship v. W.L. Bangham, Inc., 777 P.2d 623, 628 (Cal. 1989) ("The similarities
between a trustee of an express trust and a trustee under a deed of trust end with the name. 'Just as a panda is
not a true bear, a trustee of a deed of trust is not a true trustee."' (quoting Stephens, Partian & Cunningham v.
Hollis, 242 Cal. Rptr. 251, 255 (Ct. App. 1987))).
78. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 13, at 545.
79. See Monterey S.P. P'ship, 777 P.2d at 628 ("[Tjhe trustee under a deed of trust does not have a true
trustee's interest in, and control over, the trust property. Nor is it bound by the fiduciary duties that characterize
a true trustee.").
80. See Wansley v. First Nat'l Bank of Vicksburg, 566 So. 2d 1218, 1225 (Miss. 1990) (using a
"commercially reasonable" standard); DuKEMiNIER ET AL., supra note 13, at 545 ("In a deed of trust, the trustee
is given the power to sell the land without going to court if the borrower defaults.").
81. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 13, at 546.
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mortgagee may file this suit regardless of the method of foreclosure used.
However, the courts' reluctance to question the validity of foreclosure sales,
coupled with the inability of foreclosure sales to generate fair market value for
the mortgagor, provide room for abuse.83 To prevent such abuse, many states
have enacted anti-deficiency legislation, regulating or eliminating deficiency
judgments. '
b. Statutory Safeguards
In addition to anti-deficiency legislation, many states have codified further
protections for the mortgagor. 5 Before a foreclosure sale takes place, the
mortgagor always has the equitable right of redemption 6 However, because this
right ends at the conclusion of the sale, 7 a majority of states have enacted
legislation granting the mortgagor a statutory right of redemption for a specified
88period of time after the sale has taken place. This period varies from state to
state but always ends within six months to two years after the sale. 9
While these procedural safeguards are designed to protect borrowers, their
efficacy is hotly debated. 90 Critics argue that statutory redemption reforms merely
reallocate the losses from irresponsible borrowing to later responsible borrowers,
increasing costs for all. 9' Further, some argue that allowing for statutory
redemption does not solve the problem, as almost no mortgagors are actually able
to make use of such statutes.92
III. PROBLEMS IN CURRENT FORECLOSURE LAW
The foreclosure process seeks to balance the competing interests of
mortgagees, mortgagors, and the borrowing public.93 Mortgagees want quick,
predictable procedures to expedite recovery and minimize loss on non-
performing loans.94 Because lenders pass increased costs on to the borrowing
82. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 34, at 708.
83. Id. at 714-16.
84. Id.
85. See id. at 745.
86. SPRANKLING, supra note 16, at 349.
87. Id.; NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 34, at 569.
88. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 34, at 745.
89. Id. at 745-46.
90. See SPRANKLING, supra note 16, at 353-54 (comparing the views of statutory redemption advocates
and critics).
91. Mark Meador, The Effects of Mortgage Laws on Home Mortgage Rates, 34 J. ECON. & BUS. 143
(1982).
92. See Mattingly, supra note 3, at 108-09 (arguing that "statutory redemption laws further reduce the
little incentive potential purchasers have to bid at foreclosure").
93. See Stark, supra note 2, at 652.
94. Mattingly, supra note 3, at 80.
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public, borrowers in general also benefit from expeditious foreclosure
proceedings.9 The specific borrowers in foreclosure, on the other hand, want
proceedings designed to protect homeowner equity. 6 The balance between these
competing interests is difficult to strike, and mortgagors usually suffer the
consequences.97  Despite numerous proposals for reform," inequities and
inefficiencies within the foreclosure process remain.
A. Existing Foreclosure Law Fails to Protect the Borrower's Equity
Foreclosure sales are referred to as "distress sales" because the homeowner is
never really made whole through the sale.99 This can be attributed to several
problems within the foreclosure process: buyers at foreclosure auctions often
receive only a quitclaim deed;'0 sellers have no real incentive to either obtain
(through buyers other than the mortgage company itself) or bid a fair price for the
subject property at a foreclosure auction;'0 ' prospective buyers other than the
mortgagee must bid in cash;' °2 the sales are not well publicized; 03 and prospective
buyers have no real opportunity to inspect the property. '°'
The combination of these defects artificially lowers sale prices at foreclosure
auctions. There is simply too much risk and too little incentive for any bidder to
pay market price for the property. '°6 Buyers cannot buy as easily or with the same
confidence as they would in a non-foreclosure land sale. 0 7 This lowers the
95. Stark, supra note 2, at 652 ("To the extent that the lender is not made whole through the foreclosure
process, the lender will transfer those costs to all borrowers in the form of higher fees or interest rates.").
96. Mattingly, supra note 3, at 80.
97. See Johnson, supra note 55, at 966-72 (discussing the difficulty of realizing full value at a
foreclosure sale); see generally Mattingly, supra note 3 (advocating an approach that increases competition
among bidders at foreclosure sales); SPRANKLING, supra note 16 (citing several reform proposals).
98. See Johnson, supra note 55, at 963 (proposing that foreclosed property should be sold using "the
same methods used in the retail real estate market"); Mattingly, supra note 3, at 120-22 (same); Stark, supra
note 2, at 678 (proposing "commercially reasonable sale"); Steven Wechsler, Through the Looking Glass:
Foreclosure by Sale as De Facto Strict Foreclosure-An Empirical Study of Mortgage Foreclosure and
Subsequent Resale, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 850, 880, 895 (1985) (proposing that a mortgagee could choose
between "sell[ing] the property in a standard retail sale .. , or... tak[ing] title to the property upon paying the
mortgagor the difference between the amount of the debt and the apprais[ed]" value).
99. Howard A. Elliott, Mortgage Foreclosure Sales as Fraudulent Conveyances: Living Under Durrett,
13 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 631, 633 (1986) (explaining that "[a] foreclosure sale is a distress sale; it occurs outside
the normal marketplace!).
100. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 34, at 630-31.
101. See Wechsler, supra note 98, at 874 (noting that of ninety-one foreclosure sales at which the
mortgagee was the successful high bidder, only one sale generated a surplus).
102. SPRANKLING, supra note 16, at 350.
103. See Stark, supra note 2, at 651 ("[N]o signs are posted on the property and the sale is advertised in
the legal section of the newspaper, rather than in the real estate section.").
104. Id.
105. See generally Johnson, Jr., supra note 55 (discussing the effects of foreclosure on sale prices).
106 See Stark, supra note 2, at 651-52 (discussing the risks for bidders).
107. See id.
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competitiveness of bidding at auctions.' 8 As a result, the mortgage company is
often the high bidder at a price well below the actual value of the property."°
The depressed values realized at foreclosure sales hit homeowners harder
than any other party. Following a foreclosure auction, the money from the sale is
distributed among persons holding an interest in the property." ° However, all
mortgage interests must be paid in full before the homeowner recovers any of her
equity."' In effect, this often means that a homeowner will recover nothing, even
when she holds substantial equity in her property."' In contrast, the purchasing
lender can and usually does resell the foreclosure property, pocketing the
homeowner's equity in the exchange." 3 This practice grants opportunistic
mortgage companies a windfall at the expense of homeowner equity.
B. Existing Foreclosure Law Is Economically Inefficient
Both mortgagors and mortgagees feel the impact of inefficient foreclosure
processes." 4 Unpaid interest, taxes, insurance bills, and legal costs associated
with foreclosure can prevent mortgagees from recouping their full investment. " '
These costs are further compounded by the possibility of waste between the
notice of foreclosure and the conclusion of the process.116
Additionally, the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions' ' 7  require
foreclosure properties to be sold at auction regardless of whether the remaining
108. See Mattingly, supra note 3, at 95 (noting that often the only bidder, and thus the winner, at a
foreclosure sale is the foreclosing lender).
109. See id. at 95.
110. See SPRANKLING, supra note 16, at 349-51 (noting that "any surplus sales proceeds are paid to
junior lienholders or the mortgagor").
111. See id.
112. Johnson, Jr., supra note 55, at 959 ("In the vast majority of cases, the sale price realized at [a power
of sale] foreclosure sale will be so inadequate that not only will the mortgagor lose her home but she will also
lose any equity she owns in the property.").
113. See Wechsler, supra note 98, at 851 (giving an example from the public records where the
mortgagee buys the property at auction, then resells to a third party for profit).
114. Mattingly, supra note 3, at 80-81. Professor Mattingly breaks down the competing interests as
follows:
Borrowers have an important interest in either protecting their property's equity or in reducing their
post-sale liability exposure. Lenders have an important interest in expediting their recovery on non-
performing loans, thereby reducing their losses and costs. Society, including the borrowing public,
has an interest in a fair and efficient means of foreclosure, which theoretically reduces the costs of
funds to prospective borrowers, preserves what equity is present for the benefit of the borrower, and
minimizes the strategic use of foreclosure laws.
Id.
115. See id. (illustrating the potential effect of unprofitable mortgages on mortgagees in hypothetical
form).
116. Id.
117. This includes all jurisdictions except for the two strict foreclosure jurisdictions: Connecticut and
Vermont. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 34, at 596-600; SPRANKLING, supra note 16, at 349.
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mortgage debt outweighs the fair market value of the property."8 Because the
mortgagee is often the high bidder at a foreclosure auction," 9 this requirement
often forces the mortgagee to sell the property twice: once at auction and again
through traditional means.'"0 By requiring properties to be sold at auction without
inquiry into the owner's equity interest, existing foreclosure law forces
mortgagees to engage in expensive, time-consuming, and unnecessary public
auctions despite the economic disadvantages to all parties involved.'2'
IV. PROPOSED REFORM
This Comment suggests a model in which the foreclosure process is
bifurcated into two alternative procedures. Preliminarily, the homeowner's equity
would be determined. If the homeowner does not hold sufficient equity,'22 the
court would allow the mortgagee to take title pursuant to a judicial strict
foreclosure. If, however, the homeowner holds sufficient equity, the property
would be sold at a foreclosure auction. To protect the mortgagor's equity, this
Comment suggests that state legislatures pass a fair value limitation (70% of
appraised property value) for such auctions. If the fair value limitation is not met,
the foreclosure sale would be invalid under state law. This proposal would work
to the advantage of both mortgagees and mortgagors, reducing overall process
costs while protecting homeowner equity.
A. Determination of Fair Market Value
As a preliminary matter, the court must determine the fair market value of
the mortgaged property. Black's Law Dictionary defines "fair market value" as
"[t]he price that a seller is willing to accept and a buyer is willing to pay on the
open market and in an arm's-length transaction."'23 For properties sold at
foreclosure, the 'sale price is not fair value though it may be used as evidence
on the question of fair value."' 12 4 The fair market value represents the "true
value," or "worth" of a given piece of property. 25 In a typical home sale, the
118. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 34, at 596-600.
119. See Mattingly, supra note 3, at 95 (noting that often the only bidder, and thus the winner, at a
foreclosure sale is the foreclosing lender).
120. See Wechsler, supra note 98, at 870-71 (discussing the results of a study in which "[m]ortgagees
purchased in about three-quarters of the foreclosure sales ... [and] resold the property within a year or less in
seventy percent of the cases where they bought at foreclosure").
121. Id.
122. "Sufficient equity," as used in this Comment, means equity in excess of that needed to pay all
foreclosure-related costs.
123. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1587 (8th ed. 2004).
124. DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY § 6-18 (1993) (quoting In re Joe Flynn Rare Coins, Inc.,
81 B.R. 1009,1017 (D. Kan. 1988)).
125. See Ring Surf, Property Appraisal and Market Value, http://www.ringsurf.com/online/2494-
property-appraisal-and-marketvalue.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2009) (on file with the McGeorge Law
790
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market value is determined by a variety of factors, including: the condition of the
home, neighborhood environment, comparable local sales, sales performance and
indices that forecast future value, location proximity to desirable schools and
services, and appraiser experience.
'
1
6
Several states have already adopted procedures for determining a property's
fair market value. First, in the context of anti-deficiency legislation, states
alternatively provide that the court, a jury, or appraiser may determine fair
market value. 127 In some states, if a foreclosure property sells at auction for less
than two-thirds of its appraised value, the mortgagor may either "upset" the
sale ' or limit the mortgagee's possible recovery in a deficiency judgment suit."'
Appraisal statutes may also provide guidance. Appraisal statutes facilitate the
execution of judgment in favor of involuntary lienholders.'30 Appraisal statutes
are often relevant in the context of fraudulent transfers and exist to ensure that
property sold in execution of a judgment realizes a fair price at sale. Generally,
such statutes permit interested parties to upset a sale if the property sells for less
than two-thirds of the appraised cash value of the property.13 ' All appraisal
statutes, however, exclude real property from the "two-thirds" requirement. In
the typical statute, a real property sale can only be set aside according to
traditional common law standards.'32 To upset a foreclosure sale of real property,
the proponent must show fraud, unfairness, or other irregularity in the sale. 
3
Although there is no guarantee that the appraised value of a property will in
fact reflect its fair market value, the federal government and all state
governments license and regulate appraisers to prevent conflicts of interest and to
ensure accurate appraisals.'3 4 At the federal level, Title XI of the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA)
established the Appraisal Subcommittee (ASC) of the Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council to monitor "the certification and licensing
programs for real estate appraisers in each State to determine whether the State's
policies, practices and procedures are consistent with Title XI and [to enforce]
Review) (discussing the determination of market value).
126. Id.
127. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 34, at 716-17.
128. Robert M. Zinman et al., Fraudulent Transfers According to Alden, Gross and Borowitz: A Tale of
Two Circuits, 39 Bus. LAW. 977, 1005-06 (1984).
129. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 34, at 716-45.
130. A voluntary leinholder (like a mortgagee) refers to a creditor holding a secured interest on a
particular item of property. See Zinman et al., supra note 128, at 1004-07 (providing statutory examples of such
schemes).
131. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-55-4-1 (West 1999).
132. See, e.g., id.
133. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 34, at 640.
134. For a comprehensive analysis of Title XI, see Cal. Office of Real Estate Appraisers, Fed.
Regulations, http://www.orea.ca.gov/html/fed-regs.shtml#Statement3 (last visited Mar. 21, 2009) (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review) (providing an overview of Title XI).
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the State's compliance with the requirements of Title XI.' "' Pursuant to
FIRREA, states are responsible for implementing "procedures for certifying,
licensing, supervising and disciplining individuals who are qualified to perform
real estate appraisals" in specified transactions.'3 6 Appraisers must also comply
with their state's code of professional responsibility.'
37
The reform proposed in this Comment could include the use of licensed
appraisers to determine the fair market value of a foreclosure property. This
approach could be modeled after the approaches already employed in the various
jurisdictions that have adopted anti-deficiency and appraisal legislation. While
some potential for abuse of the appraisal process would inevitably exist, the
federal and state regulations discussed above would help to ensure that appraisals
be conducted as fairly and accurately as possible.'38
B. After the Appraisal: Assessing Equity and Bifurcating the Process
The mortgagor's equity in the foreclosure property could be determined
following the fair market value determination. If the value of the foreclosure
property exceeds the remaining mortgage debt, the difference represents the
homeowner's equity in the property. ' 9 However, because the mortgagor is
responsible for the costs of the foreclosure process,' 41 the homeowner's equity
should be reduced by an amount sufficient to cover such costs. This adjusted
equity determination would reflect the defaulting mortgagor's true interest in his
property.
Following this determination, the foreclosure would be conducted pursuant
to a bifurcated process. Depending on the homeowner's equity, the foreclosure
would follow one of two alternative procedures. Under the first option, if
probable foreclosure costs exceed the homeowner's equity interest, the court
would allow the mortgagee to take title through judicial strict foreclosure. This
possibility is analyzed in Section C below. Alternatively, if the homeowner holds
equity in excess of probable foreclosure costs, the property would be sold at
auction with the imposition of a fair value limitation. This possibility is analyzed
in Section D below.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. As a practical matter, the cost of appraisals could be incorporated into the costs of the foreclosure
sale.
139. See Mattingly, supra note 3, at 91.
140. 59A C.J.S. Mortgages § 981 (2008) (explaining that a "mortgage ordinarily is a lien on the land not
only for the debt secured but also for the costs of enforcing it").
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C. The Property with No Equity: Strict Foreclosure
Ideally, foreclosure auctions are meant to protect the interests of homeowners
and junior lienholders. "The theory fueling the public sale model was that
mortgaged property would be sold at or near its fair market value and any
proceeds received by the lender in excess of its indebtedness would be delivered
to the mortgagor."'' 4' In this way, the mortgagor's equity is theoretically
protected.
However, the policy justifications for foreclosure by auction do not apply
when the mortgagor does not hold equity in his property. In such cases, the
interest of the mortgagor is aligned with the interest of the mortgagee:
satisfaction of the remaining debt. When a homeowner does not hold any equity,
it is extremely unlikely that he would realize a surplus from a foreclosure sale.'
4 2
However, the homeowner would still be liable for the costs of the foreclosure
proceeding.43 Accordingly, such foreclosure auctions provide no real benefit to
the mortgagor.144
Similarly, forced sales in this context also waste the time and money of the
mortgagee. As discussed above,' 45 various defects in the foreclosure process
artificially lower sale prices at foreclosure auctions. 1 6 Consequently, the
mortgage company is often the high bidder at auction. ' When this occurs, the
mortgagee must sell the foreclosure property twice: once at auction and again
through traditional means.148
In situations where the mortgagor holds no equity in the foreclosure property,
strict foreclosure would avoid unnecessary and economically inefficient
foreclosure auctions. All parties would benefit from this reform: homeowners
would avoid unnecessary costs and lenders could sell the property through more
effective, traditional means.
D. The Property with Equity: Imposing a Fair Value Limitation
If the homeowner holds equity in excess of probable foreclosure costs, the
traditional justifications for foreclosure auctions remain valid.' 49 Accordingly,
this proposal does not suggest a drastic change in foreclosure law in these
circumstances. However, to further protect the mortgagor's equity, state
141. Mattingly, supra note 3, at 91.
142. See Wechsler, supra note 98, at 851 (giving an example from the public records).
143. See C.J.S., supra note 140.
144. See Mattingly, supra note 3, at 95.
145. See supra Part II.A.
146. See Johnson, supra note 55, at 959-60.
147. Mattingly, supra note 3, at 95.
148. See Wechsler, supra note 98, at 851 (giving an example from the public records where the
mortgagee buys the property at auction, then resells to a third party for profit).
149. An auction would theoretically maximize the equity recovered by the mortgagor.
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legislatures should impose a fair value limitation in foreclosure sales where the
mortgagor holds sufficient equity in her property. To determine the ideal
character of this proposed limitation, it is helpful to refer to similar limitations in
fraudulent transfer law.
1. Fair Value Limitations in Fraudulent Transfer Law
a. Conceptual Overlap: Viewing the Mortgagor as an Unsecured
Creditor
In many respects, the goals and norms of fraudulent transfer law aim to
address the same concerns that exist in foreclosure law."' Both fraudulent
transfer law and foreclosure law developed from early English common law.'
More importantly, both address the same fundamental question: how should
society prioritize and protect the conflicting interests of debtors and creditors? 
52
Although the two doctrines have developed separate and distinct bodies of
law, a certain amount of overlap is unavoidable. Many mortgagors are effectively
bankrupt by the time the mortgagee acts to foreclose the mortgaged property.'53
Professor Alex Johnson analogizes the mortgagor's interest during foreclosure to
that of an unsecured creditor.'54 Although a mortgagor cannot technically have an
interest in her own property,' 55 a mortgagor's interest must be viewed differently
after foreclosure occurs. 1 6 Under Johnson's model, the mortgagor's interest at
foreclosure can be split into debt and equity interests.' When characterized
accordingly, Johnson argues that the foreclosure process should function as a
150. See Eric S. Palace, Note, In re BFP: Just a Band-Aid?-Looking for a Stable Solution that Balances
Creditors' and Debtors' Rights Under Bankruptcy Code Section 548(a)(2), 15 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 359, 369
(1996) (discussing the similarities between foreclosure law and law of fraudulent transfers).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See Johnson, supra note 55, at 1001-02 ("Recognizing the mortgagor's de facto bankruptcy status
is the key to solving the puzzle that has intrigued the commentators who have examined and criticized the
foreclosure process. If the mortgagor is functionally bankrupt, it should come as no surprise that the answer to
the foreclosure puzzle also lies in bankruptcy law.").
154. Id. at 1006-07.
155. See id. at 1006 ("To the extent that the debtor owns property free of claims by creditors, either
unsecured or secured, she is the absolute owner of that property, and it makes little sense to speak of her as
having an unsecured interest in her own property.").
156. See id. at 1006-07.
Although most commentators clearly view the mortgagor solely as an owner-debtor who has pledged
her interest in the real property to secure repayment of the debt, they ignore the fact that her interest
is pledged only to the extent of her debt.... When foreclosure occurs[,] ... the mortgagor's interest,
at least conceptually, is fractionated and defined by what is left after those with superior interests
satisfy their interest in the property. In this situation, the mortgagor's interest looks like the
prototypical junior unsecured creditor's interest.
Id.
157. Id. at 1006.
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means towards ameliorating "a common pool problem ... in a situation where
the debtor does not have enough assets to pay all the creditors."'' 8 Although
Professor Johnson's concerns mirror those already present in foreclosure law, his
analogy serves as an important reminder that the foreclosure process must be
designed to maximize the value of the foreclosure property. In pursuing this end,
the traditional foreclosure auction often fails.
b. Actual Overlap: Fraudulent Transfer Law and Foreclosure
Proceedings
In addition to the procedural and conceptual similarities between the two
doctrines, the "de facto" bankruptcy status of the mortgagor often materializes
when affected homeowners file for bankruptcy subsequent to a foreclosure
proceeding. At bankruptcy, mortgagors and third-party creditors of the mortgagor
may seek to upset the foreclosure sale as a fraudulent transfer of property under
section 548 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Act. 59  Because section 548 covers
involuntary, as well as voluntary, transfers of property, a mortgagor or other
interested party may set aside a foreclosure sale within a year of bankruptcy if the
mortgagor "received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for [the
foreclosed property] .. .and ... was insolvent on the date" of the foreclosure
sale. ' 6° In this situation, a court may scrutinize the foreclosure sale under both
foreclosure and federal bankruptcy law. The close relationship and inherent
158. Id. at 1002.
159. Section 548 states:
(a)(1) The trustee may avoid any transfer (including any transfer to or for the benefit of an insider
under an employment contract) of an interest of the debtor in property, or any obligation (including
any obligation to or for the benefit of an insider under an employment contract) incurred by the
debtor, that was made or incurred on or within 2 years before the date of the filing of the petition, if
the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily-
(A) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any
entity to which the debtor was or became, on or after the date that such transfer was made or such
obligation was incurred, indebted; or
(B)(i) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer or obligation;
and
(ii)(I) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, or
became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation;
(II) was engaged in business or a transaction, or was about to engage in business or a transaction, for
which any property remaining with the debtor was an unreasonably small capital;
(III) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts that would be beyond the
debtor's ability to pay as such debts matured; or
(IV) made such transfer to or for the benefit of an insider, or incurred such obligation to or for the
benefit of an insider, under an employment contract and not in the ordinary course of business.
11 U.S.C. § 548 (2006).
160. Id. § 548(a)(l)(B)(i)-(ii)(I).
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tension between the two doctrines has sparked much scholarly debate and
judicial attention.
6
'
Courts first began invalidating foreclosure sales as fraudulent transfers under
section 548 in 1980, following the Fifth Circuit's decision in Durrett v.
Washington National Insurance Co.162 However, Durrett quickly generated
hostile responses from lending institutions, 63 prompting the Supreme Court to
consider the issue. In BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., the Supreme Court
overturned Durrett and prohibited the use of fraudulent transfers as a means of
upsetting completed foreclosure sales.' 64 Although Durrett and BFP focused
primarily on bankruptcy issues, they may still provide important guidance in
formulating effective foreclosure reform.
c. Durrett v. Washington National Insurance Co.
In the context of bankruptcy law, Durrett suggested in dicta that a
foreclosure sale could be upset as a fraudulent transfer of property if the winning
bid did not reach 70% of the appraised property value.1 65 In Durrett, a trustee
under a deed of trust foreclosed on the plaintiff mortgagor's property,
subsequently selling the property pursuant to an otherwise valid foreclosure
sale.' 66 The foreclosure sale realized only $115,400, the exact amount remaining
due on the deed of trust.' 67 However, the court determined the fair value of the
house to be approximately $200,000 at the time of sale. 66 Nine days later, the
mortgagor filed for bankruptcy.
69
At the bankruptcy proceeding, the mortgagor sought to set aside the sale of
the foreclosed property as a fraudulent transfer under section 67(d) of the
Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. section 107(d), 70 the predecessor to section 548 of the
161. See e.g., Daniel W. Mitnik, Foreclosures and Bankruptcy: The Mortgagee-Mortgagor
Relationship, 2 BANKR. DEV. J. 317 (1985) (discussing the tensions between real estate and bankruptcy law as
pertaining to foreclosures).
162. 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980).
163. Steven M. Alden, Steven R. Gross & Peter L. Borowitz, Real Property Foreclosure as a
Fraudulent Conveyance: Proposals for Solving the Durrett Problem, 38 Bus. LAW. 1605, 1607 n.8 (1983)
(listing "the American Land Title Association, the Mortgage Brokers Institute, the American Council of Life
Insurance, the American College of Real Estate Lawyers, the California Bankers Association, and the California
Bank Clearing House Association" as groups opposed to the Durrett approach).
164. 511 U.S. 531, 538-39 (1994).
165. Durrett, 621 F.2d at 203.
166. Id. at 202-03.
167. Id. at 203.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 202.
170. Durrett articulated the relevant portions of section 107(d):
"For the purposes of, and exclusively applicable to, this subdivision:... (e) consideration given for
the property or obligation of a debtor is 'fair' (1) when, in good faith, in exchange and as a fair
equivalent therefore, property is transferred .... ." 67(d)(2) "Every transfer made and every
obligation incurred by a debtor within one year prior to the filing of a petition initiating a proceeding
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 40
current Bankruptcy Code.' As a matter of law, the court held that a sale for
57.7% of fair market value could not constitute "'fair' consideration and a 'fair
equivalent' within the meaning section 67(d)(1)."' 7' The court stated in dicta that
no "district or appellate court dealing only with a transfer of real property as the
subject of attack under section 67(d) [of the Bankruptcy Act] . . .has approved
the transfer for less than 70 percent of the market value of the property."'
7
Accordingly, the court upset the foreclosure sale as a fraudulent transfer of
property.174
Subsequent lower court decisions and several commentators viewed this
language as effectively creating a fair value limitation on foreclosure sales within
the context of fraudulent transfer law. 1 The approach adopted by the court can in
some ways be explained by analogy to Professor Johnson's common pool
problem. 76 The "fair equivalency" standard adopted in Durrett limits individual
creditor remedies in favor of maximizing the value of the asset for all creditors.
"Underlying the Durrett decision is the notion that it is fairer to distribute the
debtor-mortgagor's equity in the property to general creditors than to allow the
foreclosure sale purchaser to acquire the property at a bargain price and realize
the equity upon resale."'' 77 Some scholars have even suggested that the limitation
in Durrett does not go far enough. 78 After foreclosure and associated costs, the
lender would still usually realize a windfall profit at resale.
79
under this title by or against him is fraudulent (a) as to creditors existing at the time of such transfer
or obligation, if made or incurred without fair consideration by a debtor who is or will thereby be
rendered insolvent, without regard to his actual intent; .
Durrett, 621 F.2d at 202 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)).
171. The two codes are very similar in their treatment of fraudulent transfers 11 U.S.C. § 548 provides:
The trustee may avoid any transfer . . . of an interest of the debtor in property, or any obligation ...
incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within 2 years before the date of the filing of the
petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily . . . (B)(i) received less than a reasonably equivalent
value in exchange for such transfer or obligation; ....
11 U.S.C. § 548
172. Durrett, 621 F.2d at 203-04.
173. Id. at 203.
174. Id. at 204.
175. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 34, at 827-29 (explaining that Durrett would have created a de
facto remedy similar to a one year statutory redemption system). For a comprehensive analysis of Durrett's
meaning and impact, see Alden, Gross & Borowitz, supra note 163. But see Zinman et al., supra note 128
(critiquing the Alden article and criticizing Durrett).
176. See Johnson, supra note 55, at 1002, 1006 (discussing the mortgagor as an unsecured creditor);
supra Part III.D. .a (same).
177. Mitnik, supra note 161, at 320.
178. See William H. Henning, An Analysis of Durrett and its Impact on Real and Personal Property
Foreclosures: Some Proposed Modifications, 63 N.C. L. REV. 257, 284 (1985).
Suppose real property with a fair market value of $300,000 is sold at foreclosure to the lender for
seventy percent of the amount, $210,000. Under Durrett, the sale is final. The lender can resell the
property for $300,000 and pocket a significant portion of the debtor's equity. If the property is
placed with a broker who charges a 7 percent commission, the lender's profit is only reduced by
$21,000. In addition, the lender will have $210,000 tied up in the property during the resale period.
Assuming a 12 percent market rate of interest, he will be losing approximately $2,100 per month.
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Although Durrett unquestionably improved the economic protection provided to
mortgagors and unsecured creditors, the Durrett approach also subjected completed
foreclosure sales to considerable uncertainty and instability.' 0 Specifically, Durrett
created a de facto one-year period following foreclosure throughout which title
remained uncertain.'"' Until the expiration of this period, a mortgagor or other
creditor of the mortgagor could seek to set aside the sale as a fraudulent transfer.'
2
'This period is economically wasteful since it discourages development of the land
until title is secure."'8 3 Critics argued that the increased instability of completed
foreclosure sales under Durrett served to "chill bidding at foreclosure sales,"
lowering sale prices and effectively hurting most "those people and principles it was
designed to protect. ' 4
d. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.
Fourteen years after Durrett, the Supreme Court revisited the issue in BFP v.
Resolution Trust Corp.'85 The facts of BFP are similar to those of Durrett. In BFP,
the trustee under a deed of trust foreclosed on petitioner mortgagor's property,
subsequently selling the property pursuant to an otherwise valid foreclosure sale.'
86
The property sold at foreclosure for $433,000. '87 However, the mortgagor contended
that the true value of the property was $725,000. '88 A court following the Durrett
approach would have set the sale aside, as the foreclosure sale price represented just
under 60% of the true value of the home.' 9 Three months after foreclosure, the
mortgagor filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.' 9 At the bankruptcy proceeding, the
mortgagor sought to set aside the foreclosure sale as a fraudulent transfer under
section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code.' 9' As in Durrett, the mortgagor argued that the
There also will be closing costs associated with the resale. Even with these costs, however, the
lender or a subsequent purchaser will capture a significant profit. There is no reason why the profit
should not be available to unsecured creditors.
Id.
179. Id.
180. Henning, supra note 178, at 276-77; Mitnik, supra note 161, at 329-31; Zinman et al., supra note
128, at 978.
181. See Henning, supra note 178, at 276-77 (discussing how Durrett creates a "de facto federal right of
redemption" and a one year avoidance period).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Zinman et al., supra note 128, at 978, 1013.
185. 511 U.S. 531 (1994).
186. Id. at 533-34.
187. Id. at 534.
188. Id.
189. See Durrett v. Wash. Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that any sale price
under 70 % of the fair market value is the functional equivalent of a fraudulent transfer).
190. BFP, 511U.S. at534.
191. Id.
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foreclosure sale price could not be considered "reasonably equivalent value" under
section 548.'92
In a 5-4 decision, the Court rejected the mortgagor's claim, overturning
Durrett in the process.'9 3 Speaking for the majority, Justice Scalia held that
"'reasonably equivalent value,' for foreclosed property, is the price in fact
received at the foreclosure sale, so long as all requirements of the State's
foreclosure law have been complied with."' 94 Justice Scalia pointed out that
foreclosed property is "simply worth less.""'9 To justify this assertion, Scalia
implicitly assumed that a foreclosure sale cannot realize a fair price at auction
due to the "strictures of the foreclosure process."' 9 While this argument clearly
recognizes the inadequacy and inequity of the foreclosure process as a whole, its
logic proves circular as applied to the determination of a property's "value." As
Justice Souter's dissent points out, "[i]f a property's 'value' is conclusively
presumed to be whatever it sold for, the 'less than reasonabl[e] equivalen[ce]'
question will never be worth asking."'
9 7
Further, the logical extension of Justice Scalia's value presumption to
deficiency judgments would seem to suggest that deficiency judgments could "be
awarded simply by calculating the difference between the debt owed and the
'value,' as established by sale."'9' In reality, however, the opposite is true.
"Instead, in those jurisdictions permitting creditors to seek deficiency judgments
it is quite common to require them to show that the foreclosure price roughly
approximated the property's (appraised) value."' 99 The majority does not explain
this apparent paradox.
In BFP, Justice Scalia based his interpretation of "reasonably equivalent
value" on presumed congressional intent and principles of federalism. In
interpreting the congressional intent of section 548, Scalia denounced both
judicial activism and an overactive federal government. 20  Although he
recognized the possible equitable appeal of the Durrett approach, Scalia stated
that "such judgments represent policy determinations that the Bankruptcy Code
gives [the Court] no apparent authority to make. . . . To specify a federal
'reasonable' foreclosure-sale price is to extend federal bankruptcy law well
beyond the traditional field of fraudulent transfers, into realms of policy where it
has not ventured before. 2 °'
192. Id.
193. Id. at 545.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 539.
196. Id. at 538-39.
197. id. at 555 (Souter, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 555 n.7.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 540 (majority opinion).
201. Id.; see also Nickolai G. Levin, Constitutional Statutory Synthesis, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1281, 1367-69
(2003) (discussing the impact of BFP on the doctrine of federalism).
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Because BFP gives dispositive weight to the states' treatment of the issue,
the decision can be viewed as an invitation for states to step into the field of
protecting mortgagors.' °2 In this regard, the reform suggested in this Comment is
the logical next step in responding to BFP.
2. Application of Fraudulent Transfer Principles to Proposed Reform
This Comment suggests a 70% fair value limitation similar to the one
provided in Durrett. The key difference, however, is that instead of allowing the
court to consider this limitation for the first time in a bankruptcy proceeding, the
legislature should build the 70% limitation into the requirements for a valid
foreclosure sale. If the fair value limitation is not met, the foreclosure sale would
be invalid under state law. This characterization of invalidity would follow the
sale through possible subsequent bankruptcy proceedings. The importance of this
characterization is apparent when viewed in light of the fraudulent conveyance
standard adopted by the court in BFP.23 Under BFP, the court could overturn
such foreclosure sales as fraudulent transfers.
By building the fair value limitation into the requirements for a valid
foreclosure sale, this proposal would retain Durrett's benefits while eliminating
much of the confusion, uncertainty, and judicial overreaching concerns
engendered by the same limitation in the context of fraudulent transfer law. For a
foreclosure sale to be valid under the second prong of this proposal, the property
must first be appraised. Accordingly, all buyers at the subsequent foreclosure sale
would know the price which must be reached to validate the sale. The
consequence of a low bid would be apparent at sale and would remain uncertain
as in Durrett. This would provide a strong incentive for the mortgagee to bid or
ensure that bidding reaches 70% of the appraised value of the foreclosed
property. At a minimum, such a fair value limitation would protect the mortgagor
from the mortgagee's most egregious abuses of the foreclosure process.
Equally important, the reform proposed in this Comment would not
economically disadvantage lenders. Any additional costs to the mortgagee
created by the fair value limitation would be minimal and would be offset by the
process costs saved through the use of strict foreclosures when the mortgagor has
no equity. 2°4 According to Professor William H. Henning, a 70% limitation is
sufficient to allow mortgagees to recoup foreclosure and investment costs while
202. See Palace, supra note 150, at 384, 391-92 (suggesting that the Legislature amend section 548 to
define "reasonably equivalent value").
203. See BFP, 511 U.S. at 545 (indicating that a court may overturn a foreclosure sale as a fraudulent
transfer if the foreclosure would be invalid under state law).
204. See supra Part II.D (proposing a strict foreclosure prong as a part of a bifurcated foreclosure
process).
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still allowing for a small windfall after resale of the property. 05 This proposal
merely disallows the unjustifiably large windfalls realized by some mortgagees.
E. Implementation of the Proposal
In the context of foreclosure law, the fair value limitation merely clarifies the
standard that a court may use to invalidate a foreclosure sale. By replacing
current standards2  with a bright-line (70%) rule, this proposal would increase
the stability of completed foreclosure sales while furthering the principle of
judicial economy.
In the context of fraudulent transfer law, the proposal could easily be
implemented under the BFP framework. A foreclosure sale which does not reach
the 70% fair value limitation would be invalid under state law. In a subsequent
bankruptcy proceeding, the sale could thus be set aside as a fraudulent transfer
under BFP. This proposal merely asks the legislature to make the policy
determination that the BFP Court lacked the authority to make.
V. CONCLUSION
The current economic crisis has again brought the fairness and efficiency of
the foreclosure process to the forefront of public debate. Under such scrutiny, it
is apparent that the process unduly harms the parties it is meant to protect.
Borrowers are unable to protect equity interests, lenders are forced to hold
unnecessary and economically inefficient foreclosure auctions, and the general
borrowing public absorbs the resulting cost through higher interest rates. The
need for reform is both obvious and pressing.
The reform suggested in this Comment would benefit all parties involved in
the foreclosure process. The proposal would protect homeowners' equity while
reducing foreclosure costs for mortgagees. The saved costs could then be passed
on to the borrowing public through lower interest rates. Finally, the reform
proposed in this Comment would reduce litigation over inequitable foreclosures.
If this proposal is adopted, all parties would benefit from the resulting
improvements in the foreclosure process.
205. Henning, supra note 178, at 284.
206. See supra Part 11.B (discussing current standards).

